## On the Stability & Efficiency of Network Bargaining with Search Friction

Should One Buy Free Trade Coffee at Starbucks<sup>TM</sup>?

Vijay G Subramanian<sup>1</sup>

EECS Dept., Northwestern University Joint work with T. Nguyen and R. Berry, Northwestern University


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### **Motivation**



#### Coffee supply chains



Credit default swaps Trading in supply-chain & banking/financial networks

#### Characteristics:

- Middlemen involved in such trade networks
- Bilateral trading limited by connectivity
- Faster trades: electronic platforms & high-frequency trading
- Few models exists to analyze the impact

#### Issues:

- Stability: Do stable trading strategies exist or does state fluctuate?
- Efficiency: When profitable, does trade actually happen?

Goals:

- Understand bilateral trading with network constraints
- Understand impact of speed of trading on stability

# Methodology


### Approach:

- Dynamic non-cooperative bargaining as a micro-market mechanism
- Scale to increase size of economy
- Analyze limiting dynamics

#### Challenges:

- Network Structure: Incorporating local constraints on trade
- Bargaining Procedures: Modeling inter-party bargaining
- Large Market: Model market power as number of agents increase
- Frictions: Impact speed of trading

### Model



- Trading network: sellers, middlemen & buyers ( $\leq$  2 hops)
- Each node (agent type) has  $m \geq 1$  agents
- Each seller has one indivisible good
- Each agent can have at most one good
- Trade only along directed edges, transaction cost  $C_{ij}$  for edge (i, j)
- Only buyers consume item, value  $V_k$  for type k
- Middlemen make money by flipping good
- Network, transaction costs are common knowledge

## Contributions

- 1. Define a local bargaining process, incorporates search friction
- 2. Prove as system scales limiting "stationary" equilibria exist Uses fluid limit of Markov process + incentive constraints
- 3. Use this solution concept to study how network structure impacts trade
  - Asymptotic efficiency:

 With patient agents, only cheapest routes will be taken
Endogenous delays: Network introduces distortions Even when profitable, trade may get delayed With delays, sellers surplus<sup>2</sup> is 0

Details: http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.2869

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Many gallons of coffee were consumed in the writing, most from local roasters

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Where is the coffee?

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